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The rules that in the civil legal systems regulate the succession upon death, 
highlight the conception that every legal text has about individual freedom, 
and also about the family. The variety of Spanish civil laws includes very dif-
ferent systems on the compulsory portion. And this shows up (because of 
that), that variety of conceptions. This paper analyzes the disinheritance as an 
exercise of the testamentary freedom to deprive the compulsory portion to 
certain relatives. The research aim is to show the differences and the common 
points between Spanish civil laws and to propose some legal reforms. The re-
search method used consists on the analysis of the most relevant statistics 
about the Spanish population and on the most frequent decisions of the el-
derly regarding their descendant’s inheritance. Also, last year main judicial 
decisions and the authors’ opinions have been analyzed. 
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1. Introduction 
Time and again, when writing about inheritance law and testamentary freedom, 
we must refer to the current social reality, to the historical moment in which we 
are assessing the efficiency of the various laws in force on the matter. We must 
contemplate the diverse solutions proposed by each of the seven civil law rules 
that coexist in Spain for a social reality that has evolved in parallel in all the 
country’s regions since the second half of the last century. 
Indeed, life expectancy has increased by more than thirty years in Spain since 
1940. Coupled with the declining birth rate, this means that, on average, there 
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are 2 million people over the age of 80 in the country, more than half of whom, 
from that age on, have difficulty carrying out their daily activities and need the 
material and emotional support of younger people  
(http://www.who.int/ageing/about/facts/en/). Of the almost 3 million people 
living alone in Spain, 450,000 are over the age of 80. Specifically, 140,000 
people between the ages of 85 and 89 live alone, a figure that climbs to 
250,000 in the case of people aged 80 to 84 
(http://www.ine.es/jaxi/tabla.do?type=pcaxis&path=/t00/mujeres_hombres/tabla
s_1/l0/&file=d01001.px). 
In contrast, according to data from the Bank of Spain, the highest net wealth 
in households is produced when the head of the family is between 55 and 64 
years old. In other words, hereditary succession usually occurs at the time of the 
greatest wealth for the inheritor  
(http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/PublicacionesSeriada
s/DocumentosOcasionales/08/Fic/do0810.pdf) and thus does not constitute his 
or her main economic lifeline; rather, status and livelihood are mainly the result 
of cultural capital (education). 
These data suggest that, in keeping with the literature, today the law of succes-
sion is less important than in the past (Delgado, 2012), and that the right to the 
compulsory share, provided for under all the succession systems in force today 
in Spain—except the Ayala and Navarre systems, which provide for a purely 
nominal compulsory share—does not fulfill the same economic and social pur-
pose as in the past. Consequently, its social interest should be revisited (Parra, 
2009). 
The concept of family has likewise changed considerably in recent decades. 
Family refers to the smallest area of daily life, the so-called nuclear family. Fam-
ily relationships have become increasingly vertical as more and more families 
have fewer children and parents and grandparents live longer (López, González, 
& Sánchez, 2015). Family changes are also directly related to the significant in-
crease in divorce (source: INE, Statistics on Annulments, Separations and Di-
vorces for 2015) for example, due to the resulting concurrence of children from 
different marriages or the presence in the inheritance of a widow or widower 
who is not the parent of the deceased’s descendants. The upward trend in the 
number of reconstituted families is clear; in 2011, such families acounted for 
7.5% of all families, twice as many as in 2001 (Rivas, 2012, Navas, 2013). In this 
context, there is a constant concern for the legal protection of the surviving 
spouse—or, today, partner in a stable relationship—to the detriment of the 
children (Bosch, 2017). Parents usually encourage their children to complete 
professional training, providing financial support while they do so, or guarantee 
them a livelihood through various mechanisms of wealth transfer. Once they 
have done that, when the future decedent is a person in the final stretch of his or 
her life, the rules regarding the compulsory share are often regarded as a real 
impediment to his or her testamentary freedom (Orozco, 2016). The need or de-
sire that people express to “discriminate” among their descendants, favoring the 
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one deemed neediest, is also a relevant issue arising, in particular, in cases in 
which one family member has a disability (Garrido, 2009, Jou, 2015). 
All these realities must be considered when analyzing the institution of disin-
heritance that, albeit with different formulations, exists in Spain’s civil systems 
and allows the testator to deprive all or some of his or her entitled relatives of 
their compulsory share (Rebolledo, 2010b: p. 30, Rams, Moreno, & Rubio, 2017; 
Román, 2016, Blasco, 2013). This paper aims to consider the role of the institu-
tion of disinheritance from the perspective of people exercising their testamen-
tary freedom in the final stretch of their lives. 
In light of the above considerations, first, it is necessary to assess the position 
of the elderly when they undertake the task of planning their succession. They 
benefit from a number of advantages over the young when exercising this right, 
in particular, the possibility of knowing the circumstances of each family mem-
ber, which is most likely an established situation. It is thus easier for them to 
make the right decisions by treating their successors unequally according to their 
actual needs. Older people also have fairly accurate knowledge of the possibilities 
and needs of their life partner—whether a spouse or other form of partner—and 
similarly know what they do not want to happen as a result of their death, often 
due to past experiences (e.g., family disputes or the application of inheritance 
rules that favor the children at the widow or widower’s expense, Gomá 2017). 
However, there are also risks, especially the risk of waiting too much to make 
succession decisions, such that by the time an elderly person does so, he or she is 
less capacitated, due to age or illness. The elderly may also be dangerously in-
fluenced by relatives or third parties or even have lost the equanimity and good 
judgment associated with good physical and mental health. As the elderly popu-
lation grows, so does the risk of diseases that can affect people’s volitional capac-
ity. There are many more cases of testators who are more vulnerable due to age 
or physical and mental health issues, which can easily lead to cases of undue in-
fluence on their disposition mortis causa (Spanish authors: García 2014; Vaquer, 
2015, Lasarte, 2007. For a non-Spanish perspective on this doctrine: Spivack, 
2010, Madoff, 1997; Scalise, 2008; Kerridge, 2000, y 2002, Ridge, 2004, Hartog, 
2012). 
In short, in the final period of life, the average testator has two main objec-
tives: to secure the future of their spouse once they are gone (It is a major argu-
ment in the literature that a significant number of married people would like to 
favor their spouse in their dispositions mortis causa beyond what is allowed by 
the rules protecting the compulsory share of their descendants, Delgado, 2012) 
or, if the testator is single or already widowed, to reward or protect those who 
care for them in their final days, whether or not they are relatives (Garrido, 2009; 
Jou, 2015). To this end, in their 2008 reform, Catalan lawmakers established the 
proviso that if a person wishes to favor their professional caregiver mortis causa, 
they must make a will or succession agreement before a notary, i.e., the interven-
tion of a notary public to assess the testator’s capacity and free will is mandatory 
(Art. 412-5.2 Catalan Civil Code (CCCat), Del Pozo, Vaquer, and Bosch, 2017; 
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Gómez, 2009, Sonnekus, 2007). This legislative option is in keeping with an in-
ternational trend arising precisely as a result of people’s increasing longevity (the 
German Heim Gesetz or Section 21350 of the California Probate Code attach the 
sanction of absolute nullity to any provision in favor of the professional caregiv-
er or residential center). However, it offers a more balanced solution than that 
advocated by the legal doctrine of undue influence, as it enables the notary to 
exercise a cautionary action to assess whether or not the possibility of undue in-
fluence has been taken into account, so that the testator can dispose in favor of 
their caregiver provided that that is their freely formed will. 
In this social context one must ask about the efficiency of disinheritance. As 
currently regulated, does it work to get rid of unwanted persons entitled to a le-
gitime, so to speak? In other words, if we ignore the cases in which disinherit-
ance is used as an instrument to sanction criminal conduct by forced heirs, in 
which the institution usually works, with the courts upholding the testator’s will 
to punish, when what marks the life of the testator beyond the threshhold of the 
age of 80 is filial lack of affection and neglect, or a lack of support in illness or 
solitude, is disinheritance an efficient tool for making family relationships more 
supportive? 
Finally, when the testator honestly thinks that one of his or her forced heirs 
does not need the money, whereas other people or institutions do, is disinherit-
ance really an instrument to make the legitimary institution more flexible so that 
the testator’s will regarding the post-mortem fate of his or her estate can be ful-
filled? 
2. The Basis of the Compulsory Share in Current Spanish 
Systems, or How to Make the Compulsory Share  
Compatible with the Current Social and Family Reality 
To begin to answer these questions, I will now briefly address the foundation of 
the different variants of the compulsory share system in force in Spain. Some 
authors note that the compulsory share could be constitutionally protected if it is 
considered a form of protection of the family and, thus, a suitable means to re-
concile the freedom to dispose implicit in Article 33 of the Spanish Constitution 
(CE) and the protection of the family provided for under Article 39CE (Rogel, 
2017; Busto, 2015; Zubero, 2017). 
In contrast, most authors hold that the constitutional protection affects testa-
mentary freedom, not the institution of the legitimary. The matter of testamen-
tary freedom must be considered first, as a manifestation of human dignity and 
the free development of personality applied to the law of succession (Delgado, 
2012). Testation is a form of self-realization (Torres & García, 2014). The right 
to private property and inheritance are protected by Article 33 CE (López, 1997), 
which recognizes the right of an individual to dispose of their property, not only 
in life but also after their death; the Constitution thus guarantees inheritance as a 
consequence of the recognition of private property. The status of owner includes 
the ability to dispose of property intervivos, and also the ability to dispose of it 
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after death itself (Art. 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (July 31, 2008, 184 BOE). 
However, in the various inheritance systems, the freedom of the testatoris not 
cited as an absolute power and is furthermore disparately specified, as are the 
different legal systems. Testamentary freedom is considered an eminently per-
sonal power that makes it possible to bestow benefits on other people, basically 
by deciding the content of the inheritance instrument employed (what property 
to leave to whom). The guarantee of inheritance under the Spanish Constitution 
is a corollary of the recognition of private property, not an instrument of protec-
tion of the family. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of ordinary lawmakers to impose 
limits on testamentary freedom in order to enhance the social function of prop-
erty is clear. 
Although this social function does not include the essential content of the 
right to private property, it certainly does shape the ways in which the testator 
can exercise his or her powers as the owner. The fact that the compulsory share 
constitutes a legal limit on material freedom does not automatically make it an 
institution of public order in Spain (Some authors have addressed this issue, 
making special reference to German law, based on the famous sentence of the 
Constitutional Court of April 19, 2005, Vaquer, 2007; Delgado, 2012, Sánchez 
2016). Nevertheless, the legitimary system is quite important for the purposes of 
organizing one’s own succession, that is, of exercising individual testamentary 
freedom. Lawmakers intervene to determine which shares of the inheritance or 
portions of the estate should be allocated to which of the decedent’s kin and the 
legal nature of this law. They decide whether it is an individual or collective 
compulsory share, the amount, and whether it should be allocated to certain of 
the decedent’s kin over others. We must ask ourselves about the basis for the 
legitimary system, examining its effectiveness in the current historical moment 
with regard to the circumstances described in the previous section, i.e., the plan-
ning of one’s own succession by the elderly. As Vaquer has said “si a lo único 
que atiende la legítima es al interés familiar, de modo que su fundamento es la 
condición de pariente con derecho a legítima, y, más en concreto, si la legítima 
representa un deber del causante para con sus legitimarios, la consecuencia que 
debe extraerse es que procede interpretar las normas aplicables en beneficio de 
loslegitimarios. En los sistemas legitimarios sin desheredación o con causales 
muy estrictas, el legislador otorga primacía al legitimario. Sólo las ofensas más 
graves, las constitutivas de indignidad sucesoria, o acompañadas de alguna 
específica de gravedad remarcada, permiten la privación de la legítima” (Vaquer 
2007). 
This lucid reasoning points to the underlying motives of many judicial deci-
sions settling disputes related to the compulsory share, namely, that in the legal 
systems in force in Spain, the compulsory share is set up as a law for the person 
entitled to a legitime; the future decedent has a legal duty toward that person, 
but the opposite is not true (Throughout this paper, I will refer to various recent 
judgments certifying this judicial reality. They are mainly judgments of the Pro-
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vincial Courts following the Supreme Court’s decisions of June 3, 2014, and 
January 30, 2015, which are supposed to be beginning to apply the new, relevant 
Supreme Court doctrine concerning the interpretation of some causes of disin-
heritance). This is despite the fact that part of the literature situates the founda-
tion for the compulsory share in intergenerational solidarity (Parra, 2009; Ferrer, 
2011; Cañizares, 2014, Torres & García, 2014, Arroyo & Farnós, 2015). 
This is because, first, any obligations the person entitled to a legitime might 
have toward the testator are not legal obligations, but rather pertain to the 
sphere of conscience. In other words, the obligations of solidarity between the 
people entitled to a legitime and the testator are not reciprocal, at least legally. In 
addition, technically the exercise of solidarity requires a prior situation of need. 
From the perspective of the future decedent’s obligations toward his or her fam-
ily members, this would refer solely to inheritance law concerning alimony. This 
provision is only found in Spain in the collective share systems. In contrast, in 
the rest of the civil systems, the legitime is based on reasons of kinship or the re-
lationships arising from marriage or partnership, and the amount is based on 
legislative policy, not any kind of solidarity between family members. As already 
noted, the compulsory share is generally conveyed to the next generation at a 
point when the legitimaries already have sufficient financial means for their sus-
tenance (mentioned data from the Bank of Spain show that, in general, the right 
to the legitime arises at the time of greatest wealth of the legitimary). Further-
more, it is allocated equally, irrespective of the different economic needs of each 
of the people entitled to a legitime. 
In my opinion, it is necessary to rethink the concept of intergenerational soli-
darity as it is applied in civil-law systems. This would allow us to coherently 
analyze how the institution of disinheritance works. In the following pages, I 
will consider its inefficiency as a mechanism for truly encouraging two-way 
solidarity between family members, i.e., by the testator toward the person en-
titled to a legitime and by that person toward the testator. By way of example, 
in cases of disinheritance with just cause, this is what occurs in relation to the 
legal limits concerning the cause for the disinheritance and the procedure to be 
followed first by the testator and then by the heir should the person entitled to 
a legitime file a judicial claim. Were it to result in the dooming of the disinhe-
rited legitimary to a situation of economic necessity, in individual compulsory 
share systems such a circumstance would not trigger any type of solidarity me-
chanism that would result in the use of the decedent’s estate to address that situ-
ation of need. 
Spanish legal systems have certainly evolved toward a progressive weakening 
of the compulsory share (Art. 243 Law 2/2006, of June 14, Civil Law of Galicia, 
LDCG, Art 486, Legislative Decree 1/2011, of March 22, of the Government of 
Aragon, CFA, Art. 243 LDCG, Art. 238 LDCG, Art. 486 CFA, Art. 451-4 
CCCat), but have they managed to truly modify the foundation for it or its 
raison d’être? Why have these reforms not affected the institution of disinherit-
ance, except in the case of Catalonia? 
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If the compulsory share continues to be based on the legitimary’s sacred right 
on the grounds of his or her family ties to the decedent, how can the rule be in-
terpreted and applied coherently in cases of disinheritance? Has a solution really 
been achieved for the case of a testator who does not want, for founded reasons, 
to be bound by the legal require met to attribute some of his or her estate to 
some of the relatives entitled to a legitime? 
3. How Disinheritance Works in Spanish Civil Law 
This section adresses, on one side, the Spanish civil laws of collective compulsory 
share (section 3.1., about The Basque country and Aragón) and, on the other 
side, the Spanish civil laws of individual compulsory share (section 3.2, about the 
laws of the rest of Spanish territory). This way, the different legal problems and 
issues which are formulated in each civil system are shown. In addition, I state 
what my opinion is on each matter to which I allude to. 
The origins of disinheritance can be traced back to classical Roman Law; the 
testator had to institute certain relatives (the sui) as heirs or disinherit them. 
Disinheritance was intended to maintain discipline within the family by streng-
thening the testator’s authority. At first, no reason was required, i.e., in practice, 
the freedom to disinherit, and, therefore, the freedom of testation, was absolute. 
This remained the case until the causes allowing disinheritance were introduced 
under Emperor Justinian, non-observance of which could give rise to the total or 
partial invalidity of the testament by means of the “querela inoficiosi testamen-
ti.”  
Today, disinheritance continues to exist in systems of Roman origin, with the 
notable exception of the Italian Codice Civile (CCI) and the French Code, which 
do not provide for the institution of disinheritance. Instead, these systems have 
opted for a “pure system”—in some ways more coherent—whereby a compul-
sory share based on parental bonds cannot be suppressed regardless of the beha-
vior of the so-called “forced heir,” unless the latter meets one of the grounds for 
being declared unworthy to inherit (Arts. 726 and 727 French Code. As for Italy, 
see Art. 463CCI concerning the cases of “unworthiness” that may also affect 
forced heirs). 
In France, the legitimary system underwent a major reform in 2006. The 
reform turned the French legitime into a credit claim and abolished the right to 
the compulsory share for ascendants, although it did not introduce the institu-
tion of disinheritance (Malaurie & Brenner, 2016). 
In Italy, the notion of the right to a compulsory share safeguards the 
legitimary from any intention by the testator to deprive him or her of his or her 
legal share (Perlingieri, 1951, Cantelmo, 1972; Mengoni, 2000; Tatarano, 2008; 
Campagnolo, 2011; Albanese, 2012; Galgano, 2012; Fusaro, 2011; Moscati, 2013) 
However, the literature has seen a significant shift and increasingly emphasizes 
the need to respect the will of the testator. Thus, some experts in civil law have 
begun to reinterpret Italian inheritance law from the perspective of the current 
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social reality, under the protection of constitutional principles and European 
private law (Barba 2013; Bonomi, 2011; Perlingieri, 2005; Bonilini, 2009; Bartoli, 
2018). 
These experts explore formulas for reassessing and enhancing the exercise of 
private autonomy in the context of legal business mortiscausa, albeit without 
depriving the legitimaries of their right to take actions to protect themselves by 
defending their compulsory share, where appropriate. As for the principle of so-
lidarity, the most recent literature suggests that it should not be considered in 
isolation, but rather be judged in each specific case, balancing the interests at 
stake and according to the criterion of reasonableness (Barba, 2013). 
In the compulsory share systems in force in Spain, disinheritance is regulated 
as a formal act whereby the testator deprives the legitimary of his or her status as 
such and the possibility of requesting what would have been his or her compul-
sory share, provided the legitimary has committed any of the legal causes justi-
fying disinheritance. Whether or not the disinheritance is stipulated in a testa-
ment or any other succession instrument depends entirely on the testator. First, 
the testator may exercise his or her freedom not to disinherit the legitimary even 
if there are legally valid causes to do so. The testator may also exercise this free-
dom by pardoning the legitimary for hisor her behavior or reconciling with him 
or her. In contrast, should the testator decide to disinherit one or more 
legitimaries, he or she will have to show that the situation he or she is expe-
riencing and the behavior attributed to the legitimary “fit” within the narrow 
margin of the legally classified causes for disinheritance. 
3.1. The Difficulty of Combining Disinheritance with Separation in 
Collective Compulsory Share Systems 
Disinheritance coexists with separation or exclusion in the systems that provide 
for a collective compulsory share, i.e., the systems in force in the Basque Country 
and Aragon. The testator has a legal obligation to his or her closest relatives, but 
also the power to choose which among them will actually receive the material 
compulsory share. The descendants are legitimized first, but the testator may 
choose among them, even if they are less closely related (Art. 51.1 LDCV: “El 
causante podrá disponer de la legítima a favor de sus nietos o descendientes 
posteriores, aunque vivan los padres o ascendientes de aquellos.”, See also, Art. 
486 CFA) (Sánchez-Rubio, 2012). 
3.1.1. The Basque Country 
The law governing successions in the Basque Country (the Basque Civil Law Act, 
hereinafer, LDCV), which was reformed in 2015, is one of the modern laws that 
link the foundation for the compulsory share with the principle of solidarity and 
the social function of property: 
“La concepción vasca de la propiedad es modulada por la función social de la 
propiedad y por el principio de solidaridad. Junto a la propiedad individual, las 
leyes ampararán las diversas formas de propiedad comunal, familiar y social 
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peculiares del Derecho civil vasco de forma que las mismas se acomoden a la 
realidad social del tiempo en que deban ser aplicadas.” (Statement of reasons 
LDCV). 
Although the new law has considerably undermined the institution of the 
compulsory share, it is clear that the foundation for its existence continues to be 
the goal of favoring future generations, “protecting family property” through 
this attributed inheritance imposed by law. 
Prior to the reform, the Basque Country had a plural and fragmented inherit-
ance system. The compulsory share as provided for under the Spanish Civil 
Code (CCE) was in force in much of the territory, while separate systems were in 
force in Tierra Llana de Bizkaia and the Fuero de Ayala, in addition to another 
set of regulations governing the inheritance of farmsteads in Guipúzcoa. Thus, 
part of the Basque territory had a system of individual compulsory shares, while 
another part had a system of collective ones. The influence of Castilian law 
translated not only to the application of the CCE in part of the territory, but also 
to the fact that the valid collective compulsory share in Vizcaya covered four 
fifths of the flow to the widow or widower, as under the Siete Partidas, or Seven 
Parts, the medieval Code compiled under King Alfonso X the Learned. 
The new law unifies the system governing this legal attribution, establishing a 
collective compulsory share for the whole territory. This share now applies only 
to descendants, like the one previously in force only in Bizkaia, but the amount 
has been reduced to one third of the hereditary estate, with the regime of abso-
lute testamentary freedom being maintained in Valle de Ayala (Álava) (Galicia 
2016, Gil, 2016). The new Basque law deprives ascendants of the right to a com-
pulsory share. The spouse or stable partner has the status of legitimary, but their 
right is specified as a right of usufruct of varying amounts depending on whether 
or not they coincided with the decedent’s children. 
Beyond that, the collective compulsory share allows the testator to choose, 
that is, to decide which descendant will receive the material compulsory share 
consisting of one third of the estate. This mechanism, known as “separation,” 
does not affect the spouse’s usufruct in any way (Fernández, 2015) Separation 
supposes that there are several people entitled to a legitimein a descending 
straight line or, where applicable, several relatives at the same level in this line, 
and it does not have to be justified, causal, or conditional; it is valid simply be-
cause it is the testator’s freely stated will (STSJPV, 15.05.2007, RJ 2008\618.) The 
law in force since 2015 in the Basque Country seems to seek to expand the testa-
tor’s testamentary freedom, as it expressly provides that the omission of separa-
tion is the same as a tacit separation and that preterition, intentional or other-
wise, of a descendant is equivalent to his or her separation. Therefore, the sepa-
ration, whether express or tacit, omission of separation, and preterition, inten-
tional or otherwise, of a legitimary descend an tall have the same effect (Galicia 
2016). 
The only real limit to the Basque testator’s freedom in relation to his or her 
descendants is that he or she cannot leave everyone, or, where applicable, the 
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sole legitimary, out of the inheritance. The compulsory share is based on kinship 
and that portion of the inheritance must be for a legitimary, i.e., a forced heir. 
Thus, if a testator does not want his or her only child or, if there are more, any of 
his or her children to receive the compulsory share, he cannot use separation to 
achieve that goal; if he or she fails to allocate anything to any of them in the suc-
cession, it would be a case of disinheritance, whether just or unjust, or inten-
tional preterition. 
Under Article 51.2 LDCV, total preterition (of all the people entitled to a legi-
time) nullifies the inheritance provisions related to the estate. In other words, 
when the testator leaves all or his or her sole legitimary out of the inheritance, 
the testament becomes void, which, in turn, can result in the opening of an 
intestate succession (Urrutia, 2016). Surprisingly, as a result of this legislative 
decision, should the testator decide that none of the legitimaries deserves to re-
ceive the compulsory one-third share, the entire inheritance is offered ab intes-
tato. It is a solution that only makes sense if the legitimary’s preterition is erro-
neous, (Galicia, 2016) and, of course, it is a very different solution from that 
provided for in the other Spanish legitimary systems. Under those systems, in 
cases of intentional preterition, the will remains intact, but the people entitled to 
a legitimecan claim their right. It is also different from the solution applied in 
the Basque Country for the disinheritance without just cause—supposedly simi-
lar to intentional preterition—of all or the sole legitimary. In that case, the pro-
visions of the CCE apply, as the suppletive law (Art. 3 LDCV). 
In effect, as disinheritance is not regulated in the new Basque civil law, its reg-
ulation must be inferred from the CCE, which the LDCV stipulates is the sup-
pletive law. The law does not regulate the legal causes for disinheritance, or how 
the institution works. However, the wording of Article 50 LDCV, concerning the 
right of representation, does presuppose the existence of disinheritance in the 
Basque Country. Thus, in a case of disinheritance without cause, Article 851 
CCE applies, i.e., the decedent’s dispositions mortiscausa are not annulled but 
rather reduced as needed to cover the one-third compulsory share of the disin-
herited heir (STS, 15.02.2001, RJ 2001\1484). 
Lawmakers have missed a valuable opportunity to clarify how disinheritance 
works in this collective compulsory share system, which is quite different from 
the individual compulsory share provided for under the CCE. Unjust disinhe-
ritance should logically be equated with separation and intentional preterition: 
the lack of a material individual compulsory share in the Basque civil order pre-
vents Article 851 from being applied verbatim and without nuances, although 
that is consistent with its status as suppletive law. Therefore, if any of the various 
existing legitimaries is unjustly disinherited or separated, the effects are the 
same: he or she loses all material rights to receive any specific property within 
the collective compulsory share but retains his or her rights against third parties, 
as well as the right to inherit from the decedent should an intestate succession 
ultimately be opened (Art. 59.2 LDCV, Judgment of the Provincial Court of 
Vizcaya of June 15, 2015, JUR 2015\207037, and Judgment of the Provincial 
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Court of Vizcaya, of April 19, 2013, JUR 2014\148499). If the legitimary is the 
decedent’s sole descendant, he or she cannot be separated or disinherited with-
out cause, since he or she will retain the right to receive the portion of the estate 
constituting the compulsory one-third share designated by law for at least one of 
the decedent’s descendants. 
Thus, just disinheritance (i.e., one in which one of the causes provided for 
under the CCE, as the suppletive law in the Basque Country, exists) is the only 
means by which the right to a compulsory share, both formal and material, 
could be extinguished absolutely for all the people entitled to a legitime. There-
fore, in this case, Basque testators are comparable to the people subject to the in-
dividual material compulsory share system provided for under the CCE, insofar 
as they will encounter the same difficulties to effectively achieve the goal of de-
priving their descendants of their compulsory share. 
An example of this reality can be found in the case settled in the judgment of 
the Provincial Court of Guipúzcoa of December 19, 2016. The plaintiffs were 
four children entitled to a compulsory share who had brought an action to (par-
tially) challenge the will executed by D. Hezekiah. The fourth clause of the will 
disinherited the children “for having denied the testator support for no legiti-
mate cause” and thus deprived them of any right to their inheritance, adding 
that the aforementioned cause for the disinheritance was strictly true and in-
cluded in Article 853.1 CCE. The defendant heirs requested the dismissal of the 
lawsuit alleging that the testator’s children had no relationship with their father, 
that they had not offered any emotional, economic, or face-to-face support, de-
spite knowing he had cancer, and that they also refused to partition the inherit-
ance from their mother, who had died earlier, and liquidate the shared property. 
The trial judge assessed the evidence and found that there was emotional neglect 
of the father by the children, and that one could even speak of psychological 
abuse, given the parent’s anxiety and grief over the behavior of his children, 
who, since 2000, had not even called him, despite knowing that he was mortally 
ill. Based on those arguments, he dismissed the claim. However, the Provincial 
Court had no choice but to overturn the sentence on the grounds of incongruity, 
because the contested testament did not include disinheritance for the cause sti-
pulated in Article 853.2 CCE, but rather exclusively for the cause stipulated in 
the first paragraph of that article, which is the refusal, without legitimate cause, 
to provide support. The Court recalled the case law of the Supreme Court, which 
has long noted that “ha de imponerse una interpretación restrictiva en materia 
de desheredación que no sólo proclama el art. 848 del Código Civil, sino también 
la abundante jurisprudencia orientada en la defensa de la sucesión legitimaria; 
no admitiéndose ni la analogía, ni la interpretación extensiva, ni siquiera la ar-
gumentación de “minoris ad maiorem”, indicating, in relation to the provision 
of support that, “la falta de relación afectiva y comunicación entre la hija y el 
padre, el abandono sentimental sufrido por éste durante su última enfermedad, 
la ausencia de interés demostrado por su hija, en relación con los problemas del 
padre etc., son circunstancias y hechos que de ser ciertos, corresponden al cam-
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po de la moral, que escapan a la apreciación y a la valoración jurídica, y que en 
definitiva sólo están sometidos al Tribunal de la conciencia.”In keeping with this 
same restrictive interpretation, in relation to the cause for disinheritance con-
sisting of denying support to a parent or ascendant for no legitimate reason (Ar-
ticle 853.1), in its judgments of November 4, 1997 (RJ 1997, 7930), and March 
26, 1993, the Supreme Court recalled the sanctioning nature of the rule and the 
resulting need to interpret the causes for disinheritance strictly, denying that the 
lack of relationship between the heirs and the decedent, the decision to deprive 
him of their presence in life in order to comfort him during his final illness, and 
other similar behaviors could be subsumed within the unjustified refusal to pro-
vide support. 
3.1.2. Aragon 
In Aragon, the compulsory share, which corresponds only to the descendants 
and has always been collective, encompasses half of the inheritance (Art. 486 
CFA). The reduction of the amount of the collective compulsory share, from two 
thirds to half of the hereditary estate, was implemented by Law 1/1999, of Feb-
ruary 24, on succession on account of death. The collective nature of the Arago-
nese compulsory share actually refers to the testator’s freedom to distribute it 
among the group of descendants; it does not give rise to any collective or group 
right (Parra & Barrio, 2012). The group of legitimaries lacks personality and 
cannot be the holder of any right. Unlike the Basque law, Articles 503 ff. of the 
Code of Aragonese Regional Law (hereinafter, CFA) do expressly regulate prete-
rition, disinheritance, and exclusion, in that order. The systematic disposition of 
the precepts in the Aragonese law concerning these institutions enables their 
joint operation, since, as Vallet de Goytisolo has said, in practice, separation sig-
nificantly resembles disinheritance, except that it does not require a cause for the 
separation from the inheritance (Vallet, 1974). 
There are two types of exclusion of the legitimary in Aragon: the voluntary 
exclusion of descendants, after which the excluded forced heir retains his or her 
rights vis-à-vis third parties should there be a quantitative infringement of the 
collective right; and absolute exclusion, which entails the loss of all rights not 
only in the testate succession but also in the legal succession ab intestato, as well 
as the possibility of bringing an action for injury of the collective right. However, 
if the absolute exclusion affects all the people entitled to a legitime or the sole 
legitimary, then they are considered subject to simple or voluntary exclusion 
(Art. 513.3 CFA, Judgment of the Court of Justice of Aragon, of September 22, 
2011, RJ: 2012\3073) In other words, just as in the Basque civil system, the 
compulsory share cannot be extinguished absolutely and for all legitimaries 
merely by the will of the testator, because the compulsory share is based on kin-
ship. Hence, to extinguish absolutely the right to a compulsory share, both for-
mal and material, the disinheritance must be performed with just cause. The 
rules governing how this institution works are similar and adhere to the same 
principles as those contained in the CCE, i.e., the cause for the disinheritance 
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must be true and expressed in the succession agreement or testament, and, espe-
cially, should any disinherited legitimary deny that there is just cause, the bur-
den of proof to show it lies with the decedent’s heirs (Sanchez-Rubio 2016) An 
example of this can be found in the judgment of the Provincial Court of Zara-
goza of November 9, 2010, in which the Court declares the right of the testa-
tor’s grandchildren to half of the hereditary estate as a compulsory share be-
cause they had been disinherited without legal cause (the grandmother had 
stated in her will that she had disinherited them because “no le saludaban pese 
a vivir en la misma casa y no le han prestado atención de ningún tipo, no 
poniendo en su conocimiento el fallecimiento de su padre, hijo de la testadora” 
(JUR 2011\42105; See also Barrón, 2017, Sánchez-Rubio, 2016). 
In short, in both the Basque Country and Aragon, the institution of disinhe-
ritance is unnecessary if what the testator wants is to choose among his or her 
descendants, because there is already separation or exclusion for that. (One 
example is the Judgment of the Provincial Court of Teruel, of December 14, 
2016, ROJ: SAP TE 159/2016: “Así las cosas, el testador no ha desheredado a su 
hija Violeta, ni ha vulnerado la legítima, sino que tan solo ha hecho uso de la 
fiducia que tenía encomendada y atribuido a uno solo de los herederos el 
remanente hereditario”). In contrast, if the testator is over the age of 80 and has 
no relationship with and does not feel cared for by his or her children, or if he or 
she simply considers that these children no longer need his or her assets and 
thus wishes to disinherit them all, he or she will face the same challenges and li-
mitations as imposed under the legitimary system provided for in the CCE. That 
system, it should be recalled, defends the right of the children due to kinship at 
all costs and, for that very reason, does not effectively foster solidarity within 
families. The contrast between the broad distributive freedom enjoyed by testa-
tors who have more than one descendant and the narrow path to disinheritance 
with legal cause available to them should they wish to disinherit all or their sole 
child or descendant is striking. It is as if the two institutions, which are opposed 
in terms of both their foundations and how they work, do not entirely fit within 
the same legitimary system. 
3.2. The Limited Viability of Disinheritance When It Is Not Based 
on the Commission of Serious Punishable Criminal Offenses 
by the Legitimary 
In light of the aforementioned cases, which show that even in Aragon and the 
Basque Country disinheritance must be undertaken on the basis of just cause, it 
is clear that the practical problems that disinheritance poses affect all the 
legitimary systems in Spain equally. I will try to sort out these issues, some of 
which have already been mentioned above. I will limit the analysis to cases in 
which the freedom of testation is intended to be exercised through the disinhe-
ritance of legitimary descendants, not because they have committed punishable 
criminal offenses, but because either there has been a situation of material neg-
lect or emotional detachment by the people entitled to a legitime in relation to 
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the testator or the testator understands that those people do not need their 
legitimary share and wishes to leave it to other people or institutions instead. 
First, it should be recalled that in the latter case disinheritance does not work. 
It would be considered unjust, and the people entitled to a legitime would retain 
their right to the compulsory share. 
As for the rest of the cases, i.e., behaviors constituting material or emotional 
neglect, I have already referred to the substantive issue hindering the viability 
of attempts to deprive legitimaries of their compulsory share, namely, that the 
true basis of the right to the compulsory share is none other than kinship. It 
thus logically follows that the courts interpret the rules from the standpoint of 
the legitimary and the defense of his or her rights as kin to the decedent (See 
the Judgment of the Provincial Court of Cordoba of October 16, 2017 
(JUR\2017\300272), when it dismisses a case of disinheritance because it does 
not consider that there has been psychological abuse of the deceased: “Debemos 
tener presente que los derechos legitimarios (cuya desheredación se pretende) 
aparecen ligados en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico a los lazos de parentesco y no 
de afectividad.”). In addition, there are two main challenges affecting the prac-
tical viability of the institution of disinheritance: the rigidity of the legal standard 
and the procedural attribution of the burden of proof to the heir in the litigation 
of claims to a legitime brought by disinherited legitimaries. 
3.2.1. The Rigidity of the Legal Standard 
It is not easy for courts to interpret rigid rules flexibly on their own; on the con-
trary, the wording of the rules governing disinheritance in Spanish legitimary 
systems urges judges to practice a formalistic interpretation, aimed at preventing 
the institution’s viability in cases in which each and every one of the require-
ments are not met, or are not met as expressed in the law (Torres & Dominguez, 
2016). The reason for this rigidity is precisely because disinheritance is con-
ceived of as a private sanction (Jordano, 2004; Rebolledo, 2010a, Algaba, 2002; 
Albaladejo, 2013; Barrón, 2016), therefore, the “sanctioned” acts must be truly 
deserving of such consequence. However, nowadays, neglect and lack of solidar-
ity with the elderly are still not considered punishable, at least not unanimously 
or broadly. Not even since the start of the new trend in case law, initiated with 
the Supreme Court’s judgments of June 3, 2014, and January 30, 2015, can family 
solidarity and children’s duties toward their parents be said to have gained any 
ground in the hermeneutic approach used by the provincial courts that might 
result in the flexibilization of the institution of disinheritance (By way of exam-
ple, see the Judgment of the Provincial Court of Cuenca of December 30, 2016 
(AC\2016\2165). 
In contrast, when the collective legitimary system regulates the possibility of 
excluding one or more people entitled to a legitime, the testator’s power to do so 
is not linked at all to any specific reprehensible behavior on the part of the sepa-
rated legitimary. The exclusion does not imply any civil sanction: it is not neces-
sarily exercised on the basis of a moral judgment that the testator performs re-
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garding the observed behavior of those of his or her kin entitled to a legitime. 
Therefore, should the testator decide to separate one or more of these people, he 
or she is not condemning them for misbehavior, but rather freely deciding to 
distribute the compulsory share unequally, whether because he or she considers 
that the people entitled to a legitime have unequal needs or for any other reason. 
The distributive freedom is granted to the testator as a skillful tool for achieving 
a post mortem distribution of the estate in accordance with his or her interests 
and those of his or her family environment, not to separate someone who is es-
tranged or to sanction such a person for previous behavior. Hence, the excluded 
individual is entitled to file a claim against third parties should the testator dis-
pose of his or her estate beyond the legal limits to the detriment of the overall 
legitimary share (art. 512.2 CFA). 
With regard to the disinheritance for just cause of all Basque or Aragonese 
legitimaries, or of any person entitled to a legitime in all other Spanish territo-
ries, we must recall the formalities that the rule requires the testator to meet. 
First, the disinheritance must be recorded in a will or, where applicable, 
another succession instrument. Disinheritance may not be performed by 
means of an act between living people, nor may other indirect means of depriv-
ing the legitimaries of their right be used. Art. 423-10.2 CCCat provides that “la 
exclusión de un sucesor que tiene la condición de legitimario deja subsistente su 
derecho a reclamar la legítima.” Therefore, it would not be effective to try to de-
prive an heir of his compulsory share by appealing to all of the heirs who will 
determine the rules to govern the intestate inheritance except for the legitimary 
who one wants to leave out. Also illustrative is the Judgment of the High Court 
of Justice of Galicia, of October 18, 2005, RJ\2005\7545, concerning a donation 
and life contract, which concludes that disinheritance without cause cannot be 
covered under a different simulated business that does not meet the legal 
requirements of Art. 849 CCE: “Existe simulación relativa (art. 6.4 del Código 
Civil) porque bajo los negocios aparentes—vitalicio y donación—no queridos se 
oculta otro realmente querido—el de desheredación—de modo que aquellos no 
se sustentan en la causa verdadera que objetivamente cumplen (art. 1.276 del 
Código Civil) sino que se encaminan a un resultado o función distintos y como 
sucede que este fin—desheredación fuera de testamento y sin expresión de causa 
legal de acuerdo con el art. 849 del Código Civil—es contrario al ordenamiento 
jurídico.” Disinheritance may not be partial or conditioned. According to the 
provisions of Art. 451-18 CCCat, disinheritance may only be imposed absolute-
ly, just as the behavior of the legitimary may only be forgiven absolutely. Like-
wise, should the legitimary challenge the disinheritance, the courts may only lift 
or maintain the sanction, depending on the evidence presented in the proceed-
ings. 
The disinheritance clause must designate the disinherited legitimary indivi-
dually and unequivocally and state the legal cause attributed to him or her. Only 
the CCC at expressly regulates the requirement for the nominal designation of 
the disinherited legitimary. However, this requirement can be extrapolated to all 
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compulsory share systems, because it is deduced from the very nature of the in-
stitution, as the courts have pointed out (Judgment of the Provincial Court of 
Salamanca, of May 27, 2015, JUR 2015\147629). In my opinion, total disinherit-
ance intensifies, once again, the formal and restrictive nature that the institution 
is intended to have, forcing it to be performed through taxed and narrow chan-
nels, without leaving room for the testator to freely resolve the family conflict in 
which he is immersed. The Roman origin of the prohibition on partial disinhe-
ritances could be cited, and its relationship with the legitimary’s status as a 
“forced heir.” However, that view lacks a foundation in current civil law, in 
which the compulsory share can be attributed by any title, even if they all stem 
from Roman sources (Vallet, 1974; Jou, 1994; Bosch, 2002; Álvarez, 2014). It is 
not necessary, however, according to the case law, for the testator to cite the 
cause of disinheritance with the exact wording of the law itself (STS, 25.09.2003, 
RJ 2003\6442, which quotes, among others, STS, 15.06.1990, RJ 1990\4760). This 
affords the testator a small margin to explain in his or her will the reasons why 
he or she has decided to disinherit someone. It may even provide evidence in 
advance that will later help the heir prove the facts attributed to the people en-
titled to a legitime. Because, in fact, as I will discuss below, should a disinherited 
legitimary deny the existence of the legal cause and claim his or her compulsory 
share, the burden of proving the existence of just cause in the disinheritance 
performed by the decedent will correspond to the heir (Art. 850 CCE, also ap-
plicable in Galicia, Balearic Islands, and the Basque Country, Art. 451-20 CCCat, 
and Art. 509.2 CFA. Note that the proposed reform of the Civil Code advocated 
by the Association of Civil Law Professors likewise does not modify this aspect: 
“La prueba de ser cierta la causa de la desheredación corresponde a los herederos 
del causante si el desheredado la niega.”). 
3.2.2. Attribution of the Burden of Proof and the Real Possibilities the 
Testator Gives His or Her Heirs of Defending the Disinheritance 
In my opinion, the fact that it is the heir who bears the burden of proof in case of 
litigation is a decisive factor in the decision to challenge the practical effective-
ness of disinheritance in court. In fact, I think it is the main reason why so many 
disinherited people claim their compulsory share. At the same time, I think it is 
one of the factors discouraging the use of disinheritance by those who, having 
reached the age of 80, must plan their succession. First, the future decedent 
knows that it will most likely lead to litigation after his or her death. He or she 
also knows that he or she will not be there when the challenge reaches the courts 
and, therefore, will not be able to help his or her successor or successors argue 
their case and prove that the disinherited legitimaries committed the actions he 
or she considers so reprehensible. 
Even beyond these arguments, the task of preparing evidence in advance that 
this system imposes on the elderly is obviously too burdensome. It is not at all 
pleasant to describe, even before the notary notarizing the will, family secrets 
involving neglectful or detached behaviors by people who should have shown 
solidarity in the face of a situation of weakness or need on the part of their eld-
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ers. And even if the testator wishes to do so, he or she may not always be in the 
necessary physical or mental condition to assume that burden. As a result, in 
most of the many cases brought to dispute a disinheritance, the heir is forced to 
accredit past situations, which he may not be fully familiar with and which, for 
the most part, took place in the private sphere of the family, i.e., without wit-
nesses who might be considered minimally impartial. (The Judgment of the Pro-
vincial Court of Valencia, of April 19, 2016, AC\2017\483; the Judgment of the 
Provincial Court of Cuenca, of December 30, 2016, AC\2016\2165; the Judgment 
of the Provincial Court of Asturias, of June 13, 2016, JUR\2016\173005; the 
Judgment of the Provincial Court of Cordoba, October 16, 2017, JUR 
2017\300272; and the Judgment of the Provincial Court of Girona, December 28, 
2017, AC\2017\1758, among others). 
With regard to the lack of effective ability to record before a notary the reality 
of a family situation of abuse or disaffection, or even to detect attempted mani-
pulation by the closest relatives, we must once again recall the susceptibility as-
sociated with old age. This susceptibility affects the elderly person’s testamentary 
freedom, understood as the set of circumstances needed for the free determina-
tion of the will that the testator must meet at the time the succession instrument 
is drawn up (Del Pozo, Vaquer, & Bosch, 2017). This basic principle is protected 
by the legal system through the cause of unworthiness to inherit, included in Ar-
ticle 756.5 CCE, and in very similar terms in the rest of the Spanish succession 
systems (Art. 412.3 g) CCCat, Art. 328, f CFA for example) Under this cause, 
anyone who uses threat, fraud, or violence to compel the testator to grant, mod-
ify, or revoke a disposition mortis causa is considered unworthy to inherit. Cat-
alan lawmakers have further stipulated that anyone who knows of these facts and 
takes advantage of them is likewise unworthy to inherit (Gómez, 2009). The ma-
nipulation or tortious deceit of the elderly to make them violate their will mortis 
causa is clearly a form of psychological abuse against which the legal system 
must act. 
The courts have had occasion to define the actions of intimidation and mani-
pulation of the elderly that affect testamentary freedom. The Judgment of the 
High Court of Justice of Catalonia of April 8, 2010 (STSJ Catalonia, 8.04.2010, RJ 
2010\3617), is certainly illustrative. In that case, the person named as the benefi-
ciary in the penultimate testament of the deceased sued the beneficiary of the fi-
nal testament and managed to prove the existence of manipulation of the de-
ceased at the time the latter was drafted and, therefore, that it suffers from vices 
of consent, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 422 CCCat. In addition, the 
plaintiff requested that the defendant be declared unworthy to inherit: “(…) 
podemos decir que hay fuerza moral cuando se inspira a una persona el temor 
racional y fundado de sufrir un mal inminente y grave sino accede a las 
pretensiones de otra, de tal forma que produce una inhibición de su voluntad y 
el pronunciamiento o exteriorización de otra distinta, debiendo ahondarse para 
calificar la intimidación como de grave o no grave, a la edad y a la condición de 
la persona pues la capacidad de influir en la toma de decisiones no depende solo 
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de los concretos y objetivos actos realizados sino de la posibilidad de influir con 
ellos en la formación de la voluntad. En este sentido no será igual ni pueden va-
lorarse del mismo modo presiones ejercidas en personas jóvenes o saludables, 
con posibilidad de desenvolverse por sí mismas, que las dirigidas a personas 
mayores y desvalidas.” Thus, the presuppositions of this cause of unworthiness, 
which are simultaneously causes for declaring the nullity of the will due to vices 
of consent, would be as follows: a) that the unworthy person’s behavior was in-
tended to manipulate or control the testator’s will, thereby vitiating it, and that 
this induction was done illegally, i.e., the conduct need not be a criminal offense, 
but it must be qualified as unlawful; and b) that the granting, revocation, or 
modification of the testament, or, where applicable, the lack of such actions, 
against the true will of the deceased is a direct or immediate consequence of this 
tortious behavior by the unworthy person. Therefore, there must be a causal re-
lationship between the offender’s behavior and the effect of impeding the ge-
nuine expression of the will mortis causa of the manipulated testator (Judgment 
of the Provincial Court of Barcelona, of July 27, 2009, JUR 2009\417006). Need-
less to say, in such cases, the person so influenced or manipulated will almost 
never be in condition or have the moral strength needed to apply the institution 
of disinheritance against the legitimary, because of either the psychological 
abuse or the attempt to control their will. 
In short, the different inheritance systems that regulate the causes for disinhe-
ritance include the causes for unworthiness to inherit (Art. 852 CCE, Art. 
451-17.2.a CCCat, Art. 263 LDCG, Art. 510 CFA, Art. 46 CDCIB; Jordano, 
2004.; Algaba, 2011) Lawmakers thus intend for testators themselves to defend 
the integrity of their testamentary will (García & Otero, 2016). However, very 
few people use this cause for disinheritance, because they either lack the moral 
strength to face their intimidator or they are being emotionally manipulated by 
him or her and may not even be aware of the deception to which they are being 
subjected (Another recent example can be found in the Judgment of the Provin-
cial Court of the Balearic Islands of December 20, 2016 (AC\2016\2147), which 
declares the existence of manipulation by a son of his father to achieve a succes-
sion agreement defined to his benefit and to the detriment of his brother). In 
contrast, the most frequent outcome in the courts is for the testament or succes-
sion agreement drawn up by the deceased to be declared null due to the exis-
tence of manipulation, and for the beneficiary of the nullified succession instru-
ment to then be declared unworthy to inherit for the same cause (See also the 
collected case law in the Judgment of the Provincial Court of Barcelona, of Feb-
ruary 19, 2015, JUR 2015\227987). 
In summary, practice shows that the testator cannot always prepare evidence 
in advance of the grounds for the legitimary’s disinheritance, as he or she may 
not even be able to do so. Thus, in situations of abuse based on the vulnerability 
of the elderly, the mechanism of unworthiness is much more efficient than that 
of disinheritance. Any legitimary deemed incapable of succeeding the deceased 
on the grounds of unworthiness to inherit will already be deprived of his legi-
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time without the need for a cause of just disinheritance. And in those cases in 
which the testator is able to prepare evidence in advance, it can hardly be carried 
out under the necessary conditions for disinheritance based on a lack of family 
solidarity to prosper: as noted, it is not a pleasant task to perform nor does it 
seem appropriate in the current social context to place the burden for that re-
sponsibility on the elderly. 
3.2.3. The Scope of the New Trend in the Case Law and of the Reform of 
the Catalan System in Cases of Psychological Abuse and Lack of 
Family Relationship with the Decedent 
Some relevant recent judgments of the Supreme Court do seem to have changed 
the rules of the game. I am referring to the new interpretation of Article 853.2 
CCE in cases of psychological abuse of the testator by people entitled to a legi-
time (SSTS 3.06.2014, JUR181499 and 30.01.2015, RJ\2015\639). This doctrine 
should be understood to be extendable to the legitimary systems in which disin-
heritance is governed by the rules of the CCE, because it is the suppletive law in 
the absence of specific regulations in this regard (i.e., the systems in force in the 
Basque Country, Galicia, and the Balearic Islands). The Judgment of the Provin-
cial Court of Coruña, of December 4, 2014 (ROJ: SAP C 3208/2014), and the 
Judgment of the Provincial Court of Santiago de Compostela, of November 7, 
2014, JUR 2015\79445, are examples of this. 
The 2008 reform of the Catalan legitimary system, which introduced as a new 
cause of disinheritance a lack of family relationship attributable to the legitimary 
(Article 451.17 e) of the Catalan Civil Code (hereinafter, CCCat)), and its appli-
cation by the courts go in the same direction. However, are these judicial or even 
legislative solutions proving effective? To what extent has there been an increase 
in intra-family solidarity, even under the threat of losing the legitimary share? 
Indeed, it is often said that the broader the possibility of justifying a 
disinheritance is, the greater the scope of the testamentary freedom and vice 
versa, i.e., the more restrictive the interpretation of the causes for disinheritance, 
the narrower the scope of that freedom (Vaquer, 2017). Catalan lawmakers in-
troduced the cause of manifest and continued absence of a family relationship in 
an attempt to link the maintenance of the compulsory share with its evolution in 
keeping with today’s society. The courts have also echoed the current moment of 
change in relation to the inheritance process, introducing a new hermeneutic 
approach to the causes of disinheritance (De Almansa, 2012), at least with regard 
to the “open causes,” i.e., those whose legal expression allows some margin for 
interpretation and in which the testamentary freedom of the testator takes on a 
greater role. 
Beginning with the Supreme Court’s recent cases law, which can be consi-
dered extendable to all the systems in force in Spain (SSTS 3.06.2014, and 
30.01.2015) it is clear that the concept of mistreatment is evolving. Both cases 
deal with a situation of “emotional neglect,” of abuse by the descendant, and of 
the absence of personal and economic support for the testator. In both cases, the 
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testator decided to disinherit the descendant who had left the testator in such a 
state, and in both cases the Court concluded that the disinheritance was based 
on just cause. 
The literature immediately addressed the importance of the Supreme Court’s 
new approach in a proliferation of commentaries and analyses of the aforemen-
tioned sentences (Salas, 2014; González, 2015; Algaba, 2015; Barrón, 2016; Car-
rau, 2015, Clemente, 2017). Not only the literature, but also society as a whole 
applauded the new approach proposed by the Supreme Court as opposed to the 
obsolete system provided for under the CCE. (See some of the newspaper articles 
published around the time of the sentences, including: “Desheredar, misión 
imposible,” (August 31, 2014) El País; “Desheredación y libertad de testar,” 
(September 2, 2014) El Mundo; and “Quiero desheredar a mi hijo,” (April 18, 
2015) El País. 
Thus, the Supreme Court’s judgment of January 30, 2015, provides: “Se 
denuncia la infracción del art. 853.2 del Código Civil, y de la jurisprudencia de 
esta Sala (…), en relación con la interpretación y significado que en conjunto 
confieren a la expresión haberle maltratado de obra como causa de 
desheredación de un padre respecto a alguno de sus hijos. Considera la 
recurrente que el maltrato psicológico que las sentencias de ambas instancias 
ha considerado probado es de tal entidad que debe entenderse incluido en el 
concepto de maltrato de obra reseñado en el Código Civil, ya que de 
conformidad con la jurisprudencia de esta Sala no es necesario el empleo de 
violencia física para configurar la situación de maltrato de obra que da pie a 
entender aplicable la aludida causa de desheredación. Ha quedado probado que 
la causante sufrió un trato desconsiderado de su hijo, quien le despojó sin ninguna 
consideración de todos sus bienes inmuebles a través de una fraudulenta donación 
que, engañada, le obligó a hacerle a él y a sus hijos, ante notario, con inevitable 
afección en el plano psicológico o psíquico, intolerable a la luz de la realidad social 
en la que resulta altamente reprobable el hostigamiento económico habido del 
hijo para con su madre.” An analysis of the Provincial Court judgment to which 
this cassation appeal refers (Judgment of the Provincial Court of Castellón, of 
July 24, 2013, JUR 2013\324441) is extremely revealing. It was proven that the 
mother only wanted to donate one property to her son, but that he conspired to 
have other properties included in the deed. These circumstances are quite remi-
niscent of the situation of manipulation of the elderly to which I referred in the 
previous section, as a cause of both unworthiness to inherit and for disinherit-
ance. However, in this case, the testator marshalled the strength needed to turn 
against the manipulative and interested son and decided, first, to bring an action 
to revoke the donation and, second, to draw up a will disinheriting the son (al-
beit alleging the causes provided for under Article 853.2, rather than Article 
756.5, CCE). The Court did not consider that the circumstances constituted mi-
streatment; however, through a somewhat dubious interpretive technique, the 
Supreme Court decided to consider the alleged cause to be valid and the disinhe-
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ritance just. 
For its part, the Supreme Court judgment of June 3, 2014, which initiated the 
trend toward the more flexible interpretation in the case law of Article 853.2 
CCE, contemplated an even more “psychological,” or “non-abusive,” situation, 
since there was no economic dispossession of any kind of the testator. Instead, 
the Supreme Court found that: “(…) quedó probado que los hijos abandonaron 
al padre durante los últimos siete años de vida, donde, ya enfermo, quedó al 
amparo de su hermana.” The judgment places more emphasis on the father’s lo-
neliness in his last seven years of life than on the insults uttered by the two 
children prior to that or on the physical aggression he had suffered at the hands 
of one of them when they lived together. What had taken place was not physical 
or psychological mistreatment, but rather emotional neglect, originating, as 
shown in the proceedings, in the testator’s legal separation from his wife, who 
was the mother of the people entitled to the legitime and whose side they had 
taken during the separation. The Provincial Court concluded that the children 
consciously engaged in psychological abuse of their father. The Supreme Court 
confirmed this thesis and, acknowleding that psychological abuse can also be 
considered mistreatment, seemed to suggest that a system limited to recognizing 
generic “mistreatment” as a cause for disinheritance would be preferable, leaving 
it to the judge to decide, in each case, whether or not there had been a serious 
breach of family duties. 
However, most of the literature holds that the psychological abuse provided 
for under the CCE does not refer simply to disaffection or the lack of a family 
relationship, but rather requires the legitimary to engage in a very specific, se-
rious behavior that can moreover be proven (Perez, 2014, Represa, 2016, 
González, 2015). I believe that the solution provided by the Supreme Court in its 
judgment of June 3, 2014, is unsatisfactory. I am referring to the forced nature of 
its interpretation of the rule contained in the CCE. First, it makes it necessary to 
fit non-physical abuse within the legal concept of “mistreatment”. It also re-
quires considering neglect and lack of support and of a family relationship to be 
such abuse. The Supreme Court does identify this behavior with a series of ac-
tions “que determinan un menoscabo o lesión de la salud mental de la víctima”. 
It appeals to the need for a flexible interpretation, in accordance with the social 
reality, cultural mores, and values of the times in which the events take place. 
However, in my view, not having a family relationship or neglecting elders can 
be a legal cause to disinherit, not only because it entails abuse of the testator, or 
not only when the latter supposes that it does, but rather because such neglect 
goes against the fulfillment of the family duties that should be preached not only 
with regard to parents vis-à-vis their descendents but also in the opposite direc-
tion, i.e., with regard to children vis-à-vis their parents. In addition, the lack of 
reciprocity shatters the coherence of the civil legal system itself, since, under the 
law, both childhood and old age are stages of life in which people need special 
protection. Hence, the foster care of minors in a legal situation of helplessness is 
regulated through the development of the Law on the Protection of Minors by 
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each Spanish region, as is the care of the elderly, even within a family other than 
their natural one. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court’s new interpretation is not efficient for achiev-
ing friendlier intra-family relations. It is possible to neglect the duties of solidar-
ity without mistreating the testator. 
One consequence of this new case law is a wide range of decisions by the Pro-
vincial Courts. This has led to contradictions, with some courts aligning them-
selves with this new understanding of mistreatment, and others continuing to 
apply the Supreme Court’s previous doctrine. The first group includes, for ex-
ample, the Judgment of the Provincial Court of Malaga, December 26, 2014, JUR 
2015\194097, which states that serious mistreatment or insults as justified causes 
of disinheritance must, by their nature, be subject to flexible interpretation ac-
cording to the social reality, cultural sign, and values of the time in which they 
are taking place. The inclusion of psychological abuse is based on our own sys-
tem of values, referenced, mainly, in human dignity as the seed or fundamental 
core of constitutional rights (Art. 10 CE) and its projection within the frame-
work of family law as a channel of recognition of inheritance rights, especially 
the hereditary rights of the decedent’s legitimary. He adds that the inclusion of 
psychological abuse, as a form of mistreatment, in keeping with the testator’s 
expressed will has a clear projection within the framework of successions law in 
relation to the principle of “favor testamenti”. Likewise, the Judgment of the 
Provincial Court of Santa Cruz de Tenerife of March 10, 2015 (AC 2015\554), 
the Judgment of the Provincial Court of Castellón of February 12, 2015 (AC 
2015\537), and the Judgment of the Provincial Court of Lugo of October 22, 
2015 (JUR 2015\257457) establish that: “Tras las sentencias del T.S. de 3 de Junio 
de 2014 y 30 Enero de 2015 se abre la vía a una interpretación extensiva del 
concepto de maltrato que abarca no solo el de obra sino el psicológico. En efecto, 
las causas de desheredación son tasadas y no cabe su extensión pero sí puede 
efectuarse dentro de las existentes una interpretación extensiva de acuerdo con 
la realidad social (art. 3 del C. Civil) y de los principios de autonomía de la 
voluntad y de validez del negocio jurídico que en el caso podrían expresarse 
como favor testamenti. Así, si bien la ruptura emocional pasiva no es causa de 
desheredación, cuando se producen actos u omisiones que junto a tal ruptura 
provocan un sufrimiento o perturbación en el causante se estaría rebosando la 
tenue frontera entre la nula o mala relación y el maltrato psicológico suficiente 
para integrar la dicción legal”. The second group, i.e., that of restrictive 
interpretations of the causes of disinheritance, would include the Judgment of the 
Provincial Court of Barcelona of March 13, 2015 (SAP Barcelona, 13.03.2015, JUR 
2015\121032): “Entendemos que la recurrente, en sustento de sus tesis en cuanto 
postula que se trata de un desheredamiento justificado, parte de una premisa que 
no podemos compartir, cual es que la causa de desheredamiento debe ser 
interpretada correctamente y en un sentido laxo al amparo de la voluntad de los 
testadores, quienes, según se alega, no desheredaron a sus nietas porque no les 
prestaran alimentos en sentido estricto, sino que el desheredamiento se fundaba 
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en la falta de relación absoluta entre abuelos y nietas. Ello no es así. Los 
desheredamientos constituyen una institución que se manifiesta como una 
excepción al régimen de intangibilidad de la legítima, de modo que, insistimos, 
no cabe realizar interpretaciones extensivas, como la que propone el recurrente, 
sino que debe estimarse justificado únicamente cuando concurra una de las causas 
taxativamente dispuestas en la normativa aplicable. En suma, la desheredación ha 
de expresar de forma clara la causa legal en que se fundamenta y, en caso de ser 
negada, la prueba de los hechos corre a cargo del heredero.” 
Some judgments try to differentiate the circimstances included in the Su-
preme Court’s new interpretation from those referred to in the Catalan case of 
disinheritance. Thus, for example, the Judgment of the Provincial Court of Cor-
doba of October 16, 2017(JUR\2017\300272), stresses that physical or emotional 
distancing or estrangement cannot be considered the type of psychological abuse 
that has been equated in the case law with mistreatment as a cause of disinherit-
ance. Litigation over disinheritance due to mistreatment has increased, as has 
legal uncertainty. Urgent action by lawmakers seems necessary, even to amend 
the wording of Article 853.2 CCE in the sense indicated by the Supreme Court’s 
new case law. 
In connection with the “Catalan cause,” Catalan lawmakers did take action on 
the matter in 2008, establishing in Article 451-17.2 e) CCCat that legitimaries 
can be disinherited due to“[l] aausenciamanifiesta y continuada de relación fa-
miliar entre el causante y el legitimario, siesporuna causa exclusivamente im-
putable al legitimario.” The provision is intended to provide a rationale for the 
link between maintenance of the compulsory share and its evolution, in keeping 
with society’s own, without ignoring developments in other legal systems (Bar-
ron 2017, I analyzed this legal provision in relation to comparative law, I re-
ferred to the American systems in force in Oregon and California, which, taking 
this approach to the extreme, consider it premature and, therefore, that any des-
cendant who acts maliciously against the testator, exerts undue influence over 
him, or abuses his situation of old age or dependency loses all hereditary rights: 
Section 112.465 of the laws of the State of Oregon (Oregon Statutes), available at 
https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/lawsstatutes/2013ors112.html; and 
Section 259 of the California Probate Code, available at  
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=PR
OB&sectionNum=259. Thus, the legitimary system and the causes for disinhe-
ritance regulated in the current Catalan Civil Code offer a clear approach for 
systems that recognize inheritance rights based on behavior. For example, it is 
comparable with the provisions of Article 1621 A (8) of the Civil Code of Loui-
siana, which provides for a similar cause of disinheritance, allowing the parent to 
disinherit a child if the child, upon reaching adulthood, and providing he or she 
has the ability to maintain contact with his or her parent, has not done so with-
out just cause for at least two years. The following article, 1622, allows grandpa-
rents to disinherit grandchildren under similar circumstances, regardless of 
whether the grandchild committed the offense against the parent or the grand-
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parent (Barrio, 2011; see the Louisiana Civil Code, available at  
http://lcco.law.lsu.edu/?uid=60&ver=en#60. 
This cause has existed since 1985 in a system – the only one in the United 
States that combines features of both civil and common law – that recognizes the 
legitimary rights of children, although the institution has gradually been eroded 
and weakened. One of the key mechanisms to achieve this is reversing the bur-
den of proof, something that Catalan lawmakers have not done. In the Louisiana 
system, the cause indicated by the testator at the time of the disinheritance is 
presumed to be true, and it is the legitimary who must prove he or she has not 
spent two consecutive years without any relationship, that he or she did not 
know how to contact the testator, that he or she did not contact the testator for a 
just cause, or, simply, that he or she was forgiven by the testator or had recon-
ciled with him (Art. 1624 Louisiana Civil Code: “The testator shall express in the 
instrument the reason, facts, or circumstances that constitute the cause for the 
disinherison; otherwise, the disinherison is null. The reason, facts, or circums-
tances expressed in the instrument shall be presumed to be true. The presump-
tion may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence, but the unsupported 
testimony of the disinherited heir shall not be sufficient to overcome the pre-
sumption. [Acts 2001, No. 573, §1, eff. June 22, 2001].” Art. 1625 Louisiana Civil 
Code: “A person who is disinherited may overcome the disinherison by proving 
reconciliation with the testator after the occurrence of the reason, facts, or cir-
cumstances expressed in the instrument, provided he does so by clear and con-
vincing evidence.”) American case law has been dealing with the interpretation 
of this open cause of disinheritance for years, recognizing the lack of family rela-
tionship in cases in which the child is unable to prove that he or she has made 
any attempt to contact the parent in the aforementioned two-year period (Son-
nekus, 2007). 
The cause of disinheritance provided for under Article 451-17.2. e) CCCat is 
consistent with the current family model, based more on emotional ties than on 
strict ties of kinship. A separate issue is whether it can be claimed to be proving 
efficient at achieving lawmakers proposed objectives. Many authors warned of 
the risk of an increase in litigation (Lamarca, 2009; Ferrer, 2011; Arroyo & 
Farnós, 2015) which is the reason for the rule’s inefficiency (Ramos, 2007; Far-
nos 2014). An analysis of the cases that have dealt with this cause of disinherit-
ance (Judgment of the Provincial Court of Tarragona, of March 10, 2016, 
JUR\2016\98178; Judgment of the Provincial Court of Girona of December 28, 
2017, AC\2017\1758; and Judgment of the Provincial Court of Barcelona, of 
April 25, 2017, JUR\2017\267047, among others) shows that judges are obliged 
to inquire about private family matters, with the heir bearing the burden of 
proof for many situations that are quite difficult to prove. Disinheritance law-
suits are becoming very similar to those dealing with the breakup of relation-
ships, insofar as the trial delves into the moral or social level of family relations. 
Is this what the elderly testator, who will have died at the time of the disinherit-
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ance ordered in his or her will, wished? 
There are several difficulties in the application of this cause. First, regarding 
the requirement of the imputability of the cause to the legitimary, the lack of a 
family relationship with the decedent must be due to a culpable attitude. How-
ever, family breakdowns often originate in the separation of the parents. Vaquer 
proposes dispensing with this factor (Vaquer, 2017). In my view, if the 
legitimary’s responsibility is to be sought in the absence of a family relationship, 
then the judge cannot ignore the matrimonial crisis of the legitimary’s parents 
and, above all, the events subsequent to it if they are responsible for the lack of 
family relationship being prosecuted. If the responsibility of the people entitled 
to a legitime for the lack of a family relationship is not entirely clear, the judge 
cannot consider the disinheritance established in the will to be just. Thus, for 
example, the Judgment of the Provincial Court of Girona of May 14, 2015, 
concerning a case in which the start of the lack of relationship began due to a 
family rupture resulting from the divorce of the disinherited party’s parents, 
refuses to attribute the responsibility for the rupture to the legitimaries: 
“Aceptamos plenamente la argumentación jurídica que da el Juzgador respecto 
de esta causa de desheredación, especialmente en que la causa de desheredación 
sea imputable exclusivamente al legitimario, es claro que tal causa no está 
justificada, pues no puede imputarse a las nietas la falta de relación con su 
abuela, pues en el momento en que se otorgó el testamento tenían una seis años 
y diez meses y la otra cinco años, por lo que difícilmente puede imputárseles la 
falta de relación familiar a ellas, en su caso, tal falta de relación sería imputable al 
padre, que impide que su hijas se relacionen con la abuela, y dado que las causas 
de desheredación deben interpretarse restrictivamente …” Judgment of the Pro-
vincial Court of Girona, 2nd, of May 14, 2015, AC 2015\1007. See also: Judgment 
of the Provincial Court of Barcelona, of March 31, 2016(ROJ: SAP B2475/2016). 
Additionally, this culpable lack of a relationship must have endured over time. 
(But for how long? Two years is not the same as ten years, and this imprecision 
facilitates arbitrariness. Lawmakers have not specified a minimum time for the 
lack of contact to qualify as continued, an issue that is regulated in Louisiana 
(Art. 1621), where the law stipulates a minimum term of two years. 
Second, again, there is the issue of the burden of proof. The heir being sued by 
the people disinherited for this cause must prove a negative fact: a lack of family 
relationship that was moreover “manifest, the requirement of the lack of a ma-
nifest relationship does not require there to have been any previous coexistence 
between the parties affected by this lack of relationship (Farnós, 2014) i.e., that 
was significant enough to be known outside the strictly family sphere. The heir 
must also prove that it persisted at the time of the decedent’s death. 
This cause of disinheritance is clearly much more confusing than the others 
that allow the testator to deprive the legitimary of the compulsory share, which 
leaves a greater margin for the judge to decide in each case; thus, if there is in-
sufficient proof, the cause will not prosper. In my view, to safeguard the freedom 
to deprive an heir of his or her compulsory share intended to be granted to the 
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deceased, Catalan lawmakers would have done well to include the presumption 
of fact of the circumstances unless proven otherwise, i.e., they should have 
transferred the burden of proving that there was a family relationship with the 
deceased or that the legitimary was not at fault for the rupture to the legitimary. 
4. Conclusion 
As a conclusion of the whole paper, I pose two important questions that I will try 
to respond: 
From a sociological perspective and in terms of efficiency, is old age, the best 
time in life to plan one’s succession? In some ways, it is, because of the testator’s 
life experience and deep knowledge of the family situation, at both the personal 
level and in terms of wealth and establishment. In other ways, it is not, because 
of the risks associated with longevity in relation to the exercise of testamentary 
freedom: the cases of inability to testate due to illness or old age increase, as do 
those of manipulation or intimidation of a vulnerable testator by the people 
closest to him or her, sometimes even relatives. 
As for disinheritance, does it serve the greater cause, as it is currently regu-
lated, of getting rid of unwanted legitimary descendants? Apart from the cases of 
serious criminally sanctioned behavior by the legitimary, in the vast majority of 
cases it does not. The case law shows that disinheritance does not increase the 
flexibility of the compulsory share. It does not increase the freedom of testation 
because, like the rest of the legislation concerning legitimaries, it serves the in-
terests or raison d’être of that institution: the legitimary’s right arises from bonds 
of blood, and it imposes on the testator a duty to convey part of his or her estate 
to his or her kin. Therefore, succession law does not reflect true reciprocity of 
the duties of care and support within the family. As a result, the unsupportive 
behavior of the legitimary is irrelevant in most cases from a prosecutorial point 
of view. In this sense, if disinheritance does not effectively sanction unsupportive 
behaviors, then nor can it encourage the opposite behavior, i.e., intra-family so-
lidarity. 
The solution to this problem is the introduction of new causes for disinherit-
ance in the legitimary systems (something that has already been done in Catalo-
nia and that, in a certain sense, also affects the other territories through the new 
doctrine in the case law on mistreatment). However, it also requires a reform of 
the institution of disinheritance, which is rigid and formal and subject to restric-
tive interpretation. 
In short, rather than modifying or increasing the causes of deprivation of the 
compulsory share, if the aim is to afford true testamentary freedom to the testa-
tor, the compulsory share itself should be modified. The current legitimary sys-
tem is overprotective of offspring and does not reflect the social, economic, and 
family reality of the times. To this end, I believe that more balanced solutions 
should be sought, such as a legitimary benefit of a credit-assistance nature for 
relatives of the deceased who can demonstrate a situation of need. This would 
allow the testator to freely dispose of the rest of the estate and with regard to 
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those of his or her relatives who are not in need. 
To completely eliminate the compulsory share would clash with the Western 
legal tradition and its understanding of family duties. However, to continue to 
nurture a sacred right to inheritance based on kinship is absolutely inappro-
priate in today’s society. We must try to safeguard the family from possible er-
rors or injustice in the testator’s decision-making, but we must also safeguard 
the testator, as far as possible and especially once he or she has reached the age 
of 80, from the painful task of punishing bad children with a mechanism that has 
moreover proven ineffective. 
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